1836. ย. BARRETT. belong to them seem at all times to have been, and necessarily must be, inherent in them, independent of BEAUMONT any precedent; it was necessary that they should have the most complete personal security to enable them freely to meet for the purpose of discharging their important functions; and also that they should have the right of self-protection; I do not mean merely against acts of individual wrong, for poor and impotent indeed would be the privileges of Parliament, if they could not also protect themselves against injuries and affronts offered to the aggregate body, which might prevent or impede the full and effectual exercise of their parliamentary functions. This is an essential right, necessarily inherent in the Supreme Legislature of the Kingdom, and of course as necessarily inherent in the Parliament assembled in the two Houses as in one. The right of self-protection implies, as a consequence, a right to use the necessary means for rendering such self-protection effectual. Independently, therefore, of any precedents or recognized practice on the subject, such a body must à priori be armed with a competent authority to enforce the free and independent exercise of its own proper functions, whatever these functions might be. On this ground it has been, I believe, very generally admitted in argument, that the House of Commons must be, and is authorized to remove any immediate obstructions to the due course of its proceedings. But this mere power of removing actual impediments to its proceedings would not be sufficient for the purposes of its full and efficient protection; it must also have the power of protecting itself from insult and indignity wherever offered, by punishing those who offer it. Can the High Court of Parliament, or either of the two Houses 1836. of which it consists, be deemed not to possess intrinBEAUMONT Sically that authority of punishing summarily for conBARRETT. tempts, which is acknowledged to belong, and is daily v. exercised as belonging to every superior court of law of less dignity undoubtedly than itself?" Now if we apply that principle to this legislative body, which appears to possess supreme legislative authority over the whole of the island and its dependencies, we must in like manner say, that they have incidentally the power not only of punishing direct impediments to their proceedings, but indirect obstructions, such as are caused by libels reflecting on their conduct, and tending to bring their authority into contempt, and that independently of any precedent for its exercise. But if we look into the authorities adduced in this case, we shall see that this power has been exercised without dispute, so far as relates to the imprisonment of persons for contempts, from that period (1680) down to the present day. In the years 1686, 1687, 1688, 1696, and 1709 (a), and subsequently, many persons have been imprisoned for publications declared by the House to be breaches of privilege, and that power has been used so frequently, that it would probably be too late to question its existence at this day, if the case were to be determined by precedents alone. In addition to these instances of the exercise of that authority, there are occasions in which there has been something very nearly (though not positively amounting to) a direct recognition of that authority by the supreme court at home; and besides this, it seems to form part of the settlement which took place by the Act of the Colonial Legislature of the (a) 1st vol. Journals of House of Assembly, pp. 86. 93, 94. 107, 108. 115. 164, 165, 166, 167. 1 Geo. 2, c. 1, passed in the year 1728, which directs, "that all such laws and statutes of England, as have been at any time esteemed, introduced, used, accepted or received, as laws in the island, should and were thereby declared to be and continue laws of His Majesty's island of Jamaica for ever." Now among these laws of Great Britain, which had been used or received as laws in the island, was certainly the power of imprisoning persons for a breach of privilege; for I have already noticed that there are several instances of its exercise from 1680 down to 1709, which show that the powers undoubtedly belonging to the Houses of Parliament in Great Britain were exercised by the House of Assembly in Jamaica. The Jamaica statute therefore appeared to amount to an adoption and establishment in that country of the laws of England, so far as relates to the power of imprisonment for a contempt; and on this ground the legality of the power in question might be supported, if it did not belong to the Assembly, as we think it did, by law, as a necessary incident to its legislative character. For these reasons, therefore, it appears to their Lordships that the Legislative Assembly of Jamaica had the power of imprisoning for a contempt, by the publication of a libel. It may be true that they may have occasionally exercised this power of imprisonment in an improper way, as has happened in former times in the exercise of similar powers by the House of Commons in this country; yet we may well believe that persons of the station and character who constitute the members of such a body, are not likely in these days, to abuse their privileges, and that the wholesome control and influence of public opinion will prevent the revival of such evils. But, however, with that con 1836. V. BARRETT. sideration we have nothing to do; we have simply to BEAUMONT determine what the law is; and there is this circumstance attending the House of Assembly in Jamaica, which does not belong to the Legislature here, namely, that if they do carry that power to the extent of interfering with the rights and liberties of the King's subjects, and to objects which do not fairly come within their province, the supreme legislative authority in this country may repress or put an end to it. This brings me to the second question, whether this power has been in the present case properly exercised or not? It is clear that the House of Assembly was not bound to set out upon the warrant what the libel was. That point is perfectly settled in the case of Burdett v. Abbott, and it is also established by all the cases on this subject, that if one court commit for a contempt, no other court can inquire into that contempt. An objection was then taken to the mode in which the warrant was carried into execution. I must own I have felt some doubt myself upon this part of the case, and from that doubt I am not entirely removed; it is whether the warrant is a justification of all the parties have done under it; whether it authorizes anything more than the merely taking the appellant into custody. No doubt it was meant to do more, for certainly the resolution of the House recited in it, goes to a much greater extent; that the appellant should not only be taken into the custody of the serjeant-at-arms, but stand committed to the common gaol of the county of Middlesex, and be detained there; and there is no question that the framer of this warrant intended to have embraced all these objects, but in the concluding part he has not used the proper language to carry that 1836. V. BARRETT. intention into effect. The rest of their Lordships do not feel the doubt to the same extent that I do; they BEAUMONT also think that the form of the pleadings does not require that the imprisonment in the county gaol of Middlesex should be justified. With respect to the case of the Speaker, his plea stands entirely independent of any defect in the warrant, and is not affected by it, if such a defect exists; with respect to the magistrates also, all they profess to justify is the taking the appellant into custody, the carrying him to gaol and imprisoning him; and as the rest of their Lordships think that all that is required to support that plea, was the authority to take the appellant into custody and imprison him somewhere, that authority is undoubtedly given by this warrant. The same reason applies to the pleas of the other defendants, including that of the keeper of the gaol; all have a right by this warrant to concur in taking the appellant into custody, and keeping him in custody in some place, and that in the opinion of their Lordships is the substance of the plea. Upon these grounds, therefore, it appears to their Lordships that the judgment of the Court below ought to be affirmed; but in consequence of the doubt as to the form of the warrant, the judgment will be affirmed without costs. |