while, as we have had occasion to observe, the impulse cannot come from the other side, without entirely sweeping away the sovereign authority. Neither is it to us a very serious objection, that in such a constitution, the royal power is apt to enter as too copious an element. When the people have once obtained a place in the legislature, their influence, backed by the natural force of public opinion, seldom fails insensibly to extend itself; and the danger, in the first period of change, is lest this increase should proceed with too accelerated rapidity. But the question which seems to have escaped the framer of this manifesto, is, supposing it to become evident that they might wait till doomsday before the sovereign, left thus entirely to his own free will, would grant them a single privilege, (and the case, we presume, will be that of ninety-nine out of a hundred) in what manner these institutions, admitted to be desirable, and even necessary, are to be ever ob tained? His Majesty, indeed, boasts much of his recommendations to the sovereigns in alliance, to pursue a liberal policy towards their subjects. We are ready to admit the existence of such recommendations, but the people were either ignorant of them, or they must have clearly seen, that they had been made without the smallest effect. Ferdinand had continued, during six years, to pursue a system diametrically opposite, and was still pursuing it; while Naples had bound herself by treaty to Alexander's most intimate ally, not to make any change of the nature which he boasts of recommending. Indeed it is impossible not to remark the different manner in which Alexander visits the conduct of kings and of people, when both depart from his standard of propriety. To the form

er, he tenders only gentle and polite advice, the rejection of which is not productive of offence, or even coldness; while, when the latter offend, army after army is poured in, to compel them, at the point of the bayonet, to return within the sphere of their supposed duty.

Another, and not unplausible charge against the new system is, that they were chiefly produced by military interference. The irregularity of this is admitted. A constitution imposed by an army upon their reluctant fellow-citizens, is incompatible with any idea of freedom, or even of regular government. But there is a wide difference in the case, where the sentiments of the great body of the people have become so powerful and universal, as to reach and be shared even by the army; when the troops and people act in strict concert ; and when the former, after the first effervescence is over, return into their natural state of subordination. Such has been de cidedly the case, both in Spain and Naples. The constitution being once established, the soldiers, unless in a few short and easily suppressed instances, assumed nothing of a prætorian character, nor attempted to dictate the proceedings of the legislative bodies, whose assemblage they had procured. These governments were not the very best possible, but they did not bear any character of mili. tary governments.

Such considerations not having had any weight on the mind of Alexander, Austria soon found that she might calculate on his entire concurrence in the measures which she contemplated. To enable them to proceed in concert, a grand Congress was fixed at Troppau, a town of Silesia, situated near the Polish frontier. The two Emperors arrived between the 18th and 20th October, but the King of

Prussia was delayed by illness till the 7th November. The ambassadors of France and England, the Count de la Ferronays, and Lord Stewart, were allowed, probably invited, to be present. The three sovereigns were not long of coming to a full understanding. France assented, but without choosing to enter into any active concurrence. The British ambassador alone opposed, though ineffectually, the design of having recourse to arms. Towards the end of December, it was announced in a demi-official form by the Austrian Observer, that "the high monarchs have taken the firm resolution of employing all their energies, in order that the actual state of things in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, produced by revolt and violence, may be destroyed."

As a preliminary to future active measures, the monarchs took a step, the motives of which became after wards sufficiently apparent. On the 20th November, the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia, wrote each a letter to the King of Naples, inviting him to repair to meet them at an adjourned Congress to be held at Laybach, on the frontier of Northern Italy. No definite object was stated. The let ters only expressed their deep anxiety for the welfare of his Majesty, and the repose of Europe, and their earnest wish to treat with himself in person on the subject of the present state of his kingdom. His presence, they assured him, would form the surest means of conciliation-would enable them to afford new proofs of their friendship-and would promote the best interests of his kingdom. The King of France wrote, on the 3d December, a letter, in which, both as a relation and as a member of the Holy Alliance, he strongly urged compliance with this invitation.

VOL. XIII. PART I.

In Naples, meantime, great prepa rations were making for war, or at least strong resolutions passing to that effect, though not executed in a very efficient or judicious manner. On the 1st December, a great emotion was excited in the Parliament, by a royal message, in which the King, referring to the menacing atti tude of foreign powers, held out the hope of averting the calamities of war, particularly through the media. tion of France, provided certain modifications in the constitution were agreed to. These were, 1st, The formation of a House of Peers-2. The abolition of the permanent deputation of the Parliament-3. The election of the counsellors of state by the King-4. An unlimited royal veto-5. The proposition of the budget, and of new laws to originate with the King-6. The King to have the right of dissolving the Parlia ment.

The Parliament was not of a composition, or in a temper, to be at all likely to listen to such propositions, especially when recommended on a ground so little compatible with national independence. After a warm debate, in which scarcely any one attempted to support the royal propositions, a decree was passed, stating that the Parliament could take no concern in negociations which lay entirely within the sphere of the royal prerogative; but that, however great the dangers with which the kingdom was menaced, they were determined to brave them all, in order to preserve untarnished the adopted Spanish constitution.

A few days after this proceeding, the King received the letters of the three sovereigns, and immediately determined to comply with their invitation. This intention he announced in a message to the Parliament,

U

dated 7th December. He strongly protested, that his only object was to give a new proof of love to his people, and to do every thing in his power to enable them to enjoy a wise and liberal constitution. In the view of forming it, he enumerated individual liberty, the imposition of taxes, and the passing of laws by a national representative body--the liberty of the press, and the independence of the tribunals, as bases from which he would on no account depart. The tenor of the message, however, clearly indicated, that he contemplated the formation of a new and modified constitution at Laybach, under the auspices of the allied Sovereigns.

An extraordinary ferment was excited by this message, both in the Parliament and the city. Without doors, the public sentiment was strongly pronounced, both against any change in the constitution, and against the projected departure of the King. The Parliament, after a stormy debate, framed a special commission to draw up an answer. On the following day, a decree was transmitted to the King, in which, referring to the different decrees and acts upon which the constitution had been founded, they declared the impossibility of admitting any modification upon it, except those which they themselves had proposed. The King, in reply, expressed his deep grief at the light in which some persons had viewed his resolution. He never had the idea of violating the constitution to which he had sworn, but having then reserved the right of proposing modifications, he hoped to obtain the consent of the allied powers, only to such, however, as might be agreed upon by the nation, and by himself. The Parliament, still dissatisfied, only reiterated, in an address of the 9th, their determination to support the Spanish constitution, without any

modification, except what they should themselves propose. The King, thus driven out of every evasion, at length declared, by a rescript of the 10th, that his only object in going to Laybach, was to support the Spanish constitution, as generally sworn to. He then solicited a permission, in express terms, for his departure. After two days' consideration, the Parliament passed a decree, granting to the King the permission which he sought, and appointing the Duke of Calabria Regent in his absence. The King had already written to the Emperor of Austria, accepting his invitation, in terms so humble and grateful, as clearly shewed, that he considered his interposition as one of personal kindness to himself.

It appears to us very clear, that the Parliament, in granting this permission, were guilty of extreme and almost inexcusable weakness. Nothing could be more manifest, than the extreme reluctance with which, from the beginning, the King had acquiesced in the new system. What benefit, then, could ever be expected from entrusting it to his sole guardianship? Could they dream, that he would exert any strenuous efforts in support of a constitution, which they had seen him abdicate his crown rather than sanction? The sentiments of those to whom he was going, had been expressed in a manner still more unequivocal. What could be expected from the union of these parties, or what motive could there be for separating the King from his subjects, but projects the most inauspicious to the cause of Neapolitan liberty?

The King lost not a moment in availing himself of the imprudent permission which he had thus wrung from the Parliament. On the 13th, after receiving a deputation of that body, he embarked at three o'clock on board the English ship of the line

Le Vengeur, commanded by Captain Maitland. He immediately began his voyage, big with the fate of Naples. After being detained for two days by a calm off Baiæ, a favourable wind enabled him to reach Leghorn on the

19th. From Leghorn he proceeded to Florence, where he arrived on the 28th.

At this critical moment closes the year 1820. Our next Volume will narrate the final catastrophe.

THE Congress, for organizing the Germanic Confederation and the Diet which was to direct its movements, of which the great powers had procured the assemblage at Vienna, after six months of deliberation, produced, on the 17th May, 1820, their final act. To maintain peace in the interior of the Confederation, and to defend it against foreign oppression, are stated as the two main objects in forming it. The first again divides itself into two branches; the maintenance of peace between state and state, and the maintenance of peace in the interior of states.

When differences arise between states which are members of the Confederation, the Diet is first to recommend to them some mode of agreement or of arbitration among themselves. If this fails, it is to appoint a commission to treat between the parties, and endeavour to bring them to a good understanding. Should this also fail, the question is referred to tribunals, formed in bordering neutral states, whose decisions are to be enforced by the Diet.

With regard to the internal concerns of states, it is admitted as a general principle, that the Diet is not

competent to interpose. There were certain grounds of interference, however, to which the great monarchical states eagerly looked, as the means of maintaining their own security. In the case of formal resistance, and, still more, of revolt, the Diet may interpose, either upon formal application from the head of the state, or spontaneously, in case the latter is not in a condition to apply. Should there also exist in the heart of several confederate states, associations or combinations dangerous to the general safety, the Diet is authorised to concert with the heads of these states the means of suppressing such machinations. This article was not without special regard to the actual circumstances of Germany.

The question relative to the internal constitution of the German states, was treated of with very peculiar interest. Austria declared herself openly against all those changes which included any popular elements, and had used her utmost efforts to obstruct the constitutions of this description, which had been formed in the southern states. On the other hand, the constitutional system, within certain limits, was supported, not only by