no distinction with respect to such
alienation between ancestral and

-

139

acquired property. [Mussumat
Thakoor Deyhee v. Rai Baluk
Ram]
3. Ben. Reg., XI. of 1796, sec. 4,
provides that, after taking certain
specified proceedings, the Magis-
trate is to order the attachment of
any land or other real property
held by a person charged with a
criminal offence, who may evade
the Magistrate's process by flight
or concealment; by requiring the
Collector, if the absentee be a pro-
prietor of land or a Sudder Farmer,
paying revenue immediately to
Government, to hold the land or
farm in attachment until further
notice, and prescribes the measures
to be taken by the Collector.
Section 6 enacts that, "Should the
absentee neglect to attend for a
period of six months after the
lands have been ordered under
attachment, the Magistrate is to
report the case to the Governor-
General in Council, who will pass
such order upon it, and upon the
future disposal of the lands, as he
may judge proper."

A. held a Sudder farm, part of Go-
vernment Khas Mehals, paying
revenue directly to Government.
Although 4. was the sole registered
tenant, yet he was a member of a
joint undivided Hindoo family.
A. having been charged with a
criminal offence, absconded in or-
der to avoid the process of the
Foujdary Court, when the Go-
vernor-General, under the provi-

sions of Ben. Reg., XI. of 1796,
confiscated the lands, and after-
wards sold them by auction;
held,-

First, that as the Regulation is highly
penal, it must be strictly construed,
and in the absence of any express
provision for the case of joint pro-
prietors of land, or persons jointly
holding a Sudder farm, it could
not be assumed that the Legisla-
ture intended to authorize the con-
fiscation of any other property
than the share of the absconding
absentee.

Secondly, that it was not competent
to the Government, under that
Regulation, in the circumstances
of the property being held by
members of a joint undivided
Hindoo family, to sell more than
the fractional share and interest of
the delinquent absentee, and that
the fact of the lands being regis-
tered in the sole name of A. made
no difference.

Thirdly, that a sale under Regula-
tion XI., of 1796, does not carry
with it the consequences of a sale
for arrears of public revenue, by
sweeping away all sub-tenures or
incumbrances made by the de-
faulter. [Juggomohun Bukshee v.
Roy Mothooranath Chowdry] 223
4. Where an estate was originally
ancestral, belonging to a joint and
undivided Hindoo family, the pre-
sumption of law being, that a
family once joint retains that
status, can only be rebutted by
evidence of partition, or acts of
separation; and the onus probandi

lies on the party who claims a
share in such estate to prove that
it is a divided family.

The entry of the name of one mem-
ber of a joint family, as Lumbadar
(the party liable for the assessment
of the revenue) on the Registry,
being for fiscal purposes, is not
per se sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the exclusive proprietary right
of the party whose name is so
registered, and the rights of co-
partners inter se are not affected
by such registration. [Mussumat
Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall]

369

5. According to the Benares school
of Hindoo law prevailing in the
Mithila country, a Sister's son, in
the absence of lineal heirs, has no
title to succeed as heir to his de-
ceased Uncle's ancestral estate.
Suit by a Sister's son against his
Uncle's Widow to set aside an
adoption made by the Widow to
her deceased Husband. Held,
reversing the decree of the Sudder
Dewanny Adawlut at Agra, that, as
Sister's son, he had no locus standi
to sue as reversionary heir for his
deceased Uncle's estate, or to
challenge the Widow's adoption.
[Thakoorain Sahiba v. Mohum
Lall] 386; [Mussumat Mooneea
v. Dhurma] -
6. By the Hindoo law prevailing in
Benares (the Western school) no
part of the Husband's estate, move-
able or immoveable, forms portion
of his Widow's Stridhun, and she
has no power to alienate the estate
inherited from her Husband, to

393

the prejudice of his heirs, which,
at her death, devolves on them.
The estate which two Hindoo Widows
take in their Husband's property
is a joint estate.

Where a childless Hindoo dies, leav-
ing two Widows surviving, they
succeed by inheritance to their
Husband's property as one estate
in coparcenary, with a right of
survivorship; and there can be no
alienation or testamentary gift by
one Widow without the concurrence
of the other.

One of two Widows died, having

made a testamentary disposition,
whereby she gave the moiety of
her Husband's estate, which she
had been put in possession of, to
her Father and Brother. In a
suit brought by the surviving
Widow to recover the moiety,
held, that the surviving Widow
was entitled to the share of the
deceased Widow. [Bhugwandeen
Doobey v. Myna Baee]- . - 487

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See "FRAUD," 2.

"RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL

RIGHTS."

ILLEGITIMACY.

See "MAHOMEDAN LAW," 1.

INHERITANCE.

See" HINDOO LAW," 5, 6.

"MAHOMEDAN LAW," passim.

INTEREST.

Voluntary payment of larger amount
than stipulated on the loan, effect
of. [Guthrie v. Lister] - 129

See "LOAN."

ISSUES.

See "RECORDING ISSUES."

JOINT HINDOO FAMILY.
See "HINDOO Law," 1, 3, 4.

JUDGMENT CREDITOR.

See "BENAMEE," 1.
"PURCHASER."

JURISDICTION.

1. A claim of a Creditor against the
King of Delhi during his sove-
reignty was rejected as barred for
want of jurisdiction and exemption
of the King. After he was de-
posed, and a new claim brought
before the Judicial Commissioner,
under Order in Council of the
21st February, 1860, it was held,
that the Regulations of Limitation
did not apply in the circum-
stances of the position of the
Ex-King. [Lalla Narain Doss
v. The estate of the Ex-King of
Delhi]
277
2. Section 23rd of Act, No. X. of
1859, confers on the Collector of
the District where the property is
situate, jurisdiction in all suits,
whether they be for the deter-
mination of the rate of rent at
which a Pottah or Kabooleat

Held, upon the construction of a
Government Cowl in Khote tenure,
(lease for a limited period for the
purpose of cultivation) of a large
tract of swamp land, in the Island
of Salsette, in Bombay, on which
were forest trees, that the lessee
could only cut trees growing on
the lands demised for the purpose
of clearance and cultivation, or for
repairs, and that he had no right
to fell and carry away for sale un-
assessed forest timber growing on
the demised lands.
Suit by lessee against Government,

claiming damages for prohibiting

him from cutting forest trees for
sale, dismissed. [Ruttonji Edulji
Shet v. The Collector of Tanna] 295

LEGITIMACY.

See "MAHOMEDAN LAW," 1, 2.

LESSOR AND LESSEE.

See "LEASE."

LIEN.

See "MORTGAGE."

LIMITATION,
Words of.
See "POTTAH.”

Of Action.

See "CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE," 5.

LIMITATION OF SUITS.

1. Government, in cases in which it
takes upon itself to provide pay-
ment of debts claimed against the
estate of the Ex-King of Delhi,
when such claims are barred by
Regulation or Act, is entitled to
the benefit of the rule of limita-
tion barring the claim; but,
Semble. The Regulation of Limita-
tion does not apply in the circum-
stances of the position of the Ex-
King, where a suitor had been
denied justice under a plea of
jurisdiction and exemption. [Lalla
Narain Doss v. The estate of the
277
Ex-King of Delhi] -
2. Where the claim to land in the
Twenty-four Pergunnahs in pos-
session of another, is barred by
the twelve years' prescription, pro-

vided by Ben. Reg., III. of 1793,
sec. 14, his title is extinguished,
and although a party to a suit in
which the Government claims the
land, he cannot avail himself of
the Government's right of pre-
scription of sixty years to resume
and assess the land, on the footing
of the relation of Landlord and
Tenant between himself and the
Government. So held by the
Judicial Committee, reversing the
decree of the High Court at Cal-
cutta, in an ejectment suit insti-
tuted by Government for the pos-
session of lands situate in the
Twenty-four Pergunnahs, alleged
to be held by Mal and not Lak-
hiraj tenure. [Gunga Gobind
Mundul v. The Collector of the
Twenty-four Pergunnahs] 345

LINEAL DESCENDANTS.

A Sister's son has no locus standi to
bring a suit against the Tenant
for life in possession. [Thakoo-
rain Sahiba v. Mohun Lall] - 386

LOAN.

A. advanced to B., his son-in-law,
two sums of money for the pur-
pose of trade. These advances
were secured by promissory notes,
by which B. agreed to repay the
loans in three years, with inte-
rest at five per cent. B. paid
in his lifetime, and debited him-
self in his account with inte-
rest upon these loans at the rate
of eight per cent.
There was,
however, no fresh agreement as to

such increased rate of interest, nor
did A. press for it. At B.'s death
A. claimed against his estate the
principal sum due, with eight per
cent. interest. Held (reversing the
decree of the High Court of Cal-
cutta), that although B. had volun-
tarily debited himself in his ac-
counts with interest at the rate of
eight per cent., yet the legal rela-
tion created by the promissory
notes was a contract to pay five
per cent. on the money borrowed,
and the voluntary payment of
eight per cent. without conside-
ration, did not constitute a new
contract so as to bind his estate
with the payment of eight per
cent. [Guthrie v. Lister] · 129

MAHOMEDAN LAW.

1. According to the Mahomedan
law, the presumption of legitimacy
from marriage, follows the bed,
and whilst the marriage lasts, the
Ichild of the woman is taken to be
the Husband's child: but this
presumption is not ante-dated by
relation. An ante-nuptial child.
is illegitimate; a child born out
of wedlock is illegitimate, but if
acknowledged by the Father, he ac-
quires the status of legitimacy.
Such acknowledgment may be ex-
press or implied, directly proved
or presumed.

By the same law, the denial of a son
either of Nikalee (regular), or
Mootahar (irregular) marriage after
an established acknowledgment, is
untenable, though supported by a

deed of disclaimer and repudiation
by the Father.

Suit by the Son and Daughter of A.,
a Mahomedan of the Sheah sect,
claiming as his sole heirs, for a
declaration of the illegitimacy of
B., who claimed to be also a son
of A., and co-heir, as the issue of
a Moottah, or inferior marriage,
and as having been acknowledged
by A. in his lifetime as his son.
Such marriage not having been
proved to have taken place pre-
vious to the birth of B., and the
acknowledgment of the sonship
not being satisfactorily proved,
held, by the Judicial Committee,
reversing the decision of the Court
of the Judicial Commissioner of
Oude, that B. was not entitled to
any share of the property of A.,
notwithstanding that he had been
put in possession of a third by a
decree in a summary suit for the
administration of A.'s estate.
Held, also, that the onus of proof of
his illegitimacy was upon the Plain-
tiffs in such subsequent suit.
[Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed Hos-
sein Khan Bahadoor v. Hyder
Hossein Khan] ·
94