to Sacsa

conclusion of going out to meet the President in B. XIX. battle. He accordingly issued a proclamation Ch. 5. that on a certain day all his men should be ready Pizarro proclaims to march to Sacsahuana, four leagues from the march Cusco. Pizarro did this without consulting his huana. Master of the Camp. Carvajal was greatly vexed, and went to remonstrate with Pizarro. "It is in no manner fit," he said, "that your Lordship should go out to receive the enemy, which is merely lightening so much of his labour. I entreat your Lordship to believe me, and to trust somewhat to me." Pizarro replied that in occupying Sacsahuana he should have a position so admirable for giving battle, that the enemy could not attack him, except in front; and that, by means of his artillery, without coming hand to hand, he hoped to disperse them. "My lord," said Carvajal, "there are many of these strong positions at every turn in this country; and I know where to choose one, if your Lordship would allow me, which would assure us the victory.

remon

"What I contend is, that, instead of marching Carvajal's out these four leagues, to receive your enemy, strance. your Lordship should fall back to a position named Orcos, five leagues from Cusco, on the other side; and your Lordship will see the confusion and trouble which this retreat of five leagues will cause the enemy; and when you have seen that, you can decide whether it is better to give him battle, or to continue your retreat." Carvajal then reminded Pizarro that the astrologers had pronounced that this was the

252

Carvajal's Appeal to Astrology.

B. XIX, year of his life in which he would run the greatest Ch. 5. risk of losing it; and they had added that if he

escaped that danger, he would live many other years in great felicity. "Besides," he urged, "what is the necessity for giving battle now, when we can go delighting ourselves from land to land, to the grief and cost of our enemies,-at least until this astrological year has passed." It may be much doubted whether the shrewd old man cared anything about astrologers, or their

Pizarro occupies the Position of Sacsahuana. 253

Ch.

5.

predictions; but it was his final opportunity for B. XIX. endeavouring to persuade Pizarro to listen to good counsel.

resolve.

Pizarro replied in few words, that it did not Pizarro's become his honourable reputation to retreat, little or much, far or near; but that he must follow his fortunes, and abide by that which he had determined-which was, to await the enemy at Sacsahuana, and give battle to him there, without regarding the moon or the stars.

Meanwhile, the President pursued his painful way, so encumbered with baggage, artillery, and provisions, that he could not advance more than a league a day, which served to show how wise was the counsel which Carvajal had offered to his chief.

Pizarro hastened his departure from Cusco to Sacsahuana, this step being highly approved by the younger captains, and as much disapproved by the more experienced, who looked upon Carvajal as an oracle in military matters. They could not but reflect that it was a circumstance pregnant with danger that a considerable portion of their force consisted of Centeno's men, who had been so recently conquered that many of them still wore the bandages upon wounds inflicted by those who now marched side by side with them.

It was about the end of March, 1548, that Pizarro and his army moved out from Cusco, and in two days' time reached the plain of Sacsahuana.

B. XIX.
Ch. 6.

THE BATTLE OF

CHAPTER VI.

SACSAHUANA-GONZALO PIZARRO

AND CARVAJAL ARE DEFEATED.

THE position that Pizarro had determined to occupy at Sacsahuana was indeed a strong one. It lay in a corner of the valley where a river came close up to the foot of a sierra, so that they joined as it were in a point. There were some very deep ravines between the river and the sierra. In the rear of these ravines, and at some distance from them, Pizarro caused the tents for his soldiery to be pitched, in order that he might leave quite free a plain that lay between the ravines and the sierra, on which he intended to form his cavalry. Three days after Pizarro had taken up his position, the President and his army arrived upon the sierra and afterwards descended into the plain. Some skirmishes of no moment took place; but for the most part the armies gazed at each other without coming into action, the chief care of Pizarro's Captains being lest any of their men should escape and pass over to the President. Already Carvajal's advice was fully justified. The armies were not ill matched. Pizarro's men were fewer; but they were not fatigued by a long and difficult march. Their position was excellent. And they were accompanied by large numbers of

Pizarro sends to the President's Camp. 255

Ch. 6.

Indians, for the natives were greatly attached to B. XIX. Gonzalo Pizarro, and reverenced him as one of the original conquerors and as a child of the Sun.

There was discussion on the President's side whether they should give battle, or not. But, as they were greatly deficient in provisions, in wood, and even in water, it was decided that they could not delay; and the day after that on which the council had been held, was fixed for the battle.

sends two

dent's

Pizarro sent two priests, one after the other, Pizarro to require the President to declare whether he priests to possessed any instruction from the Emperor, to the the Presi effect that Pizarro should lay down the Govern- camp. ment. If he could produce the original of any such document, he, Pizarro, was ready to yield obedience to it, to lay down his office, and to quit the country; but if not, he stated that he would offer battle, and the consequences must be laid to the President's charge, and not to his. The President seized these priests, considering them as spies. He sent, however, an answer to Pizarro, stating that if he surrendered, he would pardon him and all his followers; pointing out what honour Pizarro would gain in having caused the Emperor to revoke the New Laws, if at the same time he should remain a faithful servant of His Majesty; and also what obligation they would all be under to him if he yielded himself without a battle, some for their pardon, others for their estates being secured to them, others for the preservation of their lives. But to reason in this way with Pizarro was, as GARCILASO observes, like