But whether the government of the United States, under the present Constitution, derives the power to dispose of territory and other property, by express grant, or by necessary implication; it is equally true that the power itself must be limited by the general objects for which the government was instituted. Upon any other construction, the power becomes a monstrous excrescence, and nullifies all the safe guards thrown around the rights of the States and of the people. It is in vain that the right of Congress to impose taxes is limited to a few specific purposes, if it may nevertheless make what use it pleases of the proceeds of all acquired property. It may sell our ships of war, our forts, our arsenals, our public arms, libraries and buildings, and appropriate the proceeds to any object suggested by folly, treason, or ambition. Monies raised by taxation can only be appropriated in a particular way and for particular objects. But when converted into property by purchases and then converted back again into their original form by sales; these same monies, according to this construction, are under the absolute and plenary control of Congress, and may be used, or abused, for any purpose whatever.

The true doctrine upon this subject may be stated in a few words, and needs but little argument, or illustration, to vindicate it Congress can appropriate the monies of the people, only in pursuance of the carefully defined grants of power contained in the Constitution. Under those grants, it may convert the public funds into ships of war, docks, arsenals, light houses and other establishments within the range of its duties. The proceeds of taxation are made to assume the form of property of that description, for the public good and to effectuate the objects of the confederation. When the public good no longer requires their existence in that form, and after they have been reconverted into money; all the limitations of the Constitution re-attach to such money, at once, and with all their original force. It is not the less money drawn from the people, because it has temporarily assumed another form.

Upon the whole, the Committee can see no justification for the Act of Congress in question, in either of the considerations which have been discussed above. If justified at all, it must be by quite other facts and arguments.

That Act might be a wise and constitutional one, if the federal government, within the limits of the Constitution and of a sound discretion, could raise monies at pleasure, for the purposes of distribution. It cannot be wise and constitutional upon any other hypothesis. Whatever masks may be assumed, things must come to this complexion at last. The Act of distribution implies and involves nothing short of the absolute power of Congress to impose taxes for the sake of scattering their proceeds in unlimited gifts and grants to favorite beneficiaries; and it is in that view of the subject, that it eminently concerns the liberties of the country to resist and defeat it. It would be idle to deny that any such overshadowing power exists in Congress, because no such power has ever been claimed. The evil which threatens us, is the actual exercise of such a power, under a disguise artfully selected by dangerous and designing men.

If the Act of distribution be unconstitutional, as it most clearly is, then there is no money under it, constitutionally passed to the credit of this State, in the treasury of the United States. All the proceedings under that Act, are null and void from the beginning, and we can receive no benefit from it, without a violation of the Constitution. The Act can only become operative, so far as we are concerned, by our own consent, and that consent we cannot give, without becoming direct participants in a breach of the fundamental law of the Republic.

If this view of the matter is sound, it is conclusive; since the oaths of office taken by each and every member of the Legislature, bind him to an observance of the Constitution of the United States, be the temptation to violate it ever so great and ever so pressing.

The Committee are satisfied, however, that a regard to the true interests of the State, as well as a reverence for the Constitution, requires a rejection of the money which is now held up as a glittering prize to debauch our integrity.

Its rejection would be an important means of defeating the ruinous and fatal policy of distribution. It would place Maine side by side with Virginia, New Hampshire, South Carolina and the other States which have patriotically spurned the proffered bribe; and by adding to their number, it would add to the moral force of their

example. The practical and conclusive evidence which it would afford of the deep seated hostility of the people to the scheme of distribution, would operate powerfully, to restrain Congress from its repetition hereafter. It was adopted originally, not from any regard to the true interests of the country, but as a means of securing political strength, and of aggrandizing ambitious statesmen. It was adopted because it was believed to be popular, and will be abandoned when it is found to be unpopular. To mark our condemnation of it in the most emphatic manner, is therefore the most obvious and the most effective method, by which we can resist an evil, as deplorable in its mischiefs, as it is palpably repugnant to the Constitution.

The rejection of this money will also operate to defeat the policy of distribution, by detering all those who now represent, or may hereafter represent this State in either branch of the National Legislature, from lending the aid of their votes to such a policy. Whatever their personal opinions may be, it can hardly be apprehended that any one of them will be recreant enough to sanction a measure, which perpetrates a double robbery upon his own State, because it has too much honest pride to indemnify itself by participating in a corrupt and contaminating division of the public spoils.

Interest dictates therefore, that we should reject this money, because by so doing, we strike the most effectual blow against an odious, condemned and dangerous policy.

It is said, however, that this policy is so manifestly obnoxious to the intelligent and reflecting portion of the community, and in the present state of our national finances, so utterly destitute of any plausible pretext in its favor, that it is not likely to be persisted in by its authors, and that the same vigor of opposition to it, is not now demanded, which would have been necessary under other cirThe committee are certainly not disposed to deny, that the Distribution Act is thoroughly repudiated by the great body of those who have examined its features and operation, with any tolerable care and candor. Neither are they disposed to deny that the folly of such an Act, apparent enough at all times, has become especially so at this time, when the United States are embarrassed

cumstances.

with a large and increasing debt, and the people are suffering under an unjust and onerous system of taxation. But they cannot shut their eyes to the madness and obstinacy of party spirit. They cannot conceal from themselves, that a statesman, who is thoroughly identified with the policy of distribution, is at this moment, a prominent and distinguished candidate for the Presidency, and that his supporters, whether against their better judgment or not, are every where the advocates of that policy, Condemned as it is, and abandoned as it ought to be, it is nevertheless in full vigor as one of the political elements of the times. The mischiefs which it threatens, are imminent and urgent, and however good the cause of its opponents may be, they cannot safely relax a single effort of resistance.

It is said also, that the reception of this money might be accompanied with such a protest against the policy under which it is offered to us, as would sufficiently mark our disapprobation of it. The committee are unable to concur in this opinion. The reception of the money would be a substantial act; the protest would be at best an empty declaration, and whatever might be the motives dictating it, could not fail to be regarded as one of very doubtful sincerity. If we denounce the unconstitutionality of the Act of Distribution, and at the same moment become parties to the divis ion of plunder with which it tempts us; enemies at least, and perhaps friends, would esteem the denunciation as little better than a hypocritical paltering with a sense of duty. The rejection of the money would signalize our hostility to the policy of distribution, beyond all possibility of doubt or misunderstanding. No protest against that policy, even if standing alone and by itself, could add anything to the declarations which we have so often and so solemnly made, and if accompanying a practical recognition of that policy, could not hope to escape the suspicion of being a mere subterfuge of irresolute and yielding integrity.

If it is important to Maine in common with other States, to reject this money, as the best and most effective means of resisting the future agitation of schemes of distribution, we have also a special and peculiar motive prompting to its rejection, growing out of our

position as a State having large and important claims upon the government of the United States. These claims are in the aggregate, nearly ten times as great as the amount of money, the reception, or refusal of which, is now under consideration. The Committee believe it to be demonstrable that every one of those claims is clearly just; and has been, or will be, vouched and substantiated by ample evidence. In a view however of the fact that Maine has already received large sums under the Treaty of Washington and under the Act of Congress providing for our military claims, it is manifestly our interest to study and pursue that line of policy, which will most effectually protect us from the injurious suspicion of wishing to swell our claims beyond the limits of equity and right. It is not necessary to contend that the reception of the money offered to us under the Act of Distribution would impair and lessen the just reputation of the State, but it is certain that its continued rejection would confirm and elevate it. The practical proof which it would afford, that no pecuniary bribe can seduce us into a violation of correct principles, would make the position of Maine, a high, enviable, and honorable one. It would silence all suspicions of mercenary motives, or conduct, and by so doing, would remove what may be a formidable obstacle to the reimbursement of the large sums due to us from the government of the Union. In this matter as in all others, honesty is the best policy. Rejecting with firmness what we believe does not belong to us, and what cannot be received without a compromise of principle, we can insist with firmness and effect upon what does belong to us. Refusing to participate in the plunder of the common treasury of the country, we can present the just claims which we have upon it, with clean hands and with honest confidence.

The rejection of this money is also peculiarly important to Maine, considered as an exposed and frontier State, and therefore deeply interested in the military defences of the Union. Bordering upon the North and East, upon the dominions of the most powerful nation on the globe, and with three hundred miles of assailable sea coast, we are most emphatically concerned in recalling the councils of the Confederacy to the great purposes for