Imatges de pàgina
PDF
EPUB

When Vouti began his reign he was only sixteen years of age, but one of his first resolutions was to raise his country to a higher point of splendour than it had yet reached, and he took the opportunity of inviting the opinion of the ministers and other learned men as to the means to be employed for the attainment of his object. The gist of their observations may be taken as expressed in the line that "the principles of Government did not consist in fine words or studied speeches, but in actions." Vouti's efforts towards consolidating his government were retarded and thrown back by the intrigues of his mother, who was a patron and supporter of the Taouist sect, and several of his foremost ministers, having incurred her resentment, were either executed or dismissed the service of the state. Five years afterwards the Empress-mother died in consequence, it would appear, of injuries received during a great fire at the palace, and then Vouti reinstated some of these ministers in their former offices.

Vouti's first anxiety was caused by the outbreak of a war between two Chinese princes, and, when the weaker appealed to him for assistance against the aggressive neighbour, his ministers gave opposite counsel as to whether the request should be complied with or refused. One minister, dwelling on the well-known turbulence of the people of Yuei-the modern Fuhkien-insisted that it would be foolish for the Emperor to take part in a quarrel from which he could reap no advantage. Another, Chwangtsou, took, however, the opposite view, and pointed out that the Emperor could not be considered the father of his people if he turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the weaker of his subjects. Convinced by this latter argument Vouti resolved to extend his protection to the afflicted, and entrusted the operation to Chwangtsou in person. On the approach of the Imperial troops the aggressors retired into the difficult country behind the marshes and lagoons of Fuhkien, where Chwangtsou conceived it to be prudent to leave them undisturbed. The campaign could only be considered in the light of a failure were it to conclude without securing permanent safety for those who had suffered from the incursions of the men of Yuei, and Chwangtsou accordingly obtained the sanction of the Emperor to their

AN APPALLING CALAMITY.

75

transfer to a district further removed from the borders of Fuhkien. The subjection of Yuei was left for a later day.

The country had in the meantime been afflicted by a great catastrophe, bringing in its train a famine, and such suffering to millions, as is only known to the packed populations of China and India. The mighty river Hoangho, which is, or ought to be, to the provinces of Northern China what the Kiang is to the south and centre, burst its banks, and flooded for hundreds of miles the flat low-lying country of Shensi and Kansuh. In face of this appalling calamity the utmost effort of man could accomplish little, and when the waters had abated the population fell victims to the dearth which ensued. Since that time the overflowing of the Hoangho has been periodic, and from some cause, which has never been thoroughly ascertained, that splendid river has never performed the useful functions that might be expected from it. Its gigantic course is clearly traceable on the map, but in the reality of fact it lies across Northern China deprived of half its strength and all its utility.

The surrender of the Prince of Nanyuei, and his recognition of the Emperor's authority have been already described. He was in some way threatened at this time by the turbulent people of Yuei, whose raids have been referred to, but instead of at once taking up arms for their chastisement, he asked the Emperor for advice and assistance. The local governors were instructed to take the necessary steps to comply with this demand, and the Prince of Nanyuei was encouraged to proceed to extremities. There is some reason for taking the view that these measures were put into force as a cloak for the design Vouti had formed of incorporating Yuei with the Empire. His true mind seems reflected in the following sentence from a memorial of the day: "that although Yuei never has belonged, it beyond doubt should belong to the Chinese Empire." The doubts suggested in another very able memorial, "Is the conquest of these barbarians worth the loss of the many thousand faithful subjects, which it must inevitably entail?" were never seriously discussed, when the object before the government was the acquisition of a kingdom. The Prince of Nanyuei cast aside his inactivity the

instant he found that Vouti approved of his entering the field, and marched his troops into Yuei simultaneously with the advance of the Chinese generals. The war was brought to a speedy and a bloodless conclusion. The people of Yuei refused to oppose an invader who was resolved to crush all resistance regardless of loss, and the brother of the king, playing the part of the most devoted patriot, slew the ruler, and sent his head to the Chinese commanders. Peace then ensued, on the footing of Yuei becoming a tributary province, over which Yuchen, the fratricide, was placed in authority.

In the sixth year of Vouti's reign (B.C. 135) the Tartar king sent an envoy to ask for a Chinese princess in marriage, and to express a desire for the continuance of the truce between the peoples. These periodical missions had as often as otherwise proved the precursor of war; but whatever the result, the main object of their mission had generally been granted. But a new feeling was springing up among Chinese statesmen on the subject of the Tartars. Their experience had taught them that however much the desert chiefs might promise to keep the peace, they had not the power, and perhaps not the inclination, to restrain the impulse of their followers, and they were at last beginning to recognize that no useful purpose could be served by closing their eyes to their experience, and by assuming improbabilities because pleasing. So it was that in the Grand Council assembled by Vouti for the consideration of the request of the Tartar king, the party advocating the rejection of the demand, and the adoption of stringent measures against the Tartars, took up a bolder position; but the time had not yet come when their views were to prevail. The bold policy of Wang Kua, who had had personal experience of the state of affairs on the Western border, "of destroying them rather than to remain constantly exposed to their insults," was not yet to be accepted, and the Tartars were granted one more opportunity of shaping their action towards the Chinese on a friendly basis. The difficulties of a campaign in the wilds of Central Asia appeared to the peaceful Chinese to be insuperable, and as yet their experience had not afforded them any reason to believe that the subjection of the Hiongnou could be accomplished.

THE ONLY TEST.

77

Wang Kua had no intention of abandoning what may be fairly styled his pet project, and he endeavoured to bring Vouti round to his way of thinking by his personal address, and by working on the esteem in which the Emperor held him. The defeat of Han Kaotsou, many years before, by the Tartars, was used as an argument in favour of their views by both parties; while Vouti studiously abstained from expressing an opinion one way or the other. Another Grand Council was summoned, and Wang Kua's argument that the defeat at Pingching should be retrieved proved more convincing than the contrary theory that was advanced of Kaotsou having, by his subsequent inaction, admitted that the attempt should not be made because it could not possibly succeed. Vouti closed the conference by deciding that war was to be declared. A great army was collected for the purpose, and Wang Kua, with four lieutenants under him, assumed the chief command.

Wang Kua had thus attained his heart's desire, but he was doomed to disappointment. The policy which was good and sound enough on paper was to be made to appear unwise, if not ridiculous, by the hard logic of facts. In every country, and at all ages, a daring and a prescient policy can only be proved to be justifiable by attaining success. If its development is marred by disaster, its conclusion is shorn of its anticipated proportions; the public voice will infallibly condemn it, and in most cases history agrees with the decision. There is much force in the argument that dangers that can be foreseen should be promptly grappled with and nipped in the bud, but the statesman must submit to the only test that will be applied to his measures-their success, or their failure. Such has been the case sometimes in the annals of European nations, so it was on the occasion we are discussing with Wang Kua, the Chinese statesman and general. The army, computed to number three hundred thousand men, was concentrated in the vicinity of the frontier, and Wang Kua resorted to a carefully devised stratagem for the purpose of enticing the Tartars within his reach. In this he failed. The Tartars eluded all his efforts to attack them, and the campaign closed ingloriously without result. When Vouti learnt.

the failure of the project, he ordered the arrest of his ambitious but unlucky general, who, wisely accepting the inevitable, put an end to his existence. Thus perished Wang Kua, the originator of China's aggressive policy towards the West, and the first leader of an army charged with the task of subduing Central Asia. Unfortunate for himself, his great idea took root, and became, in course of time, incorporated with the national policy.

A short lull ensued in the Tartar war, and Vouti employed all his resources in extending his Empire towards the south. The brief campaign in Fuhkien had served to create a breach between the Empire and the ruler of Nanyuei, whose protestations of fidelity were received with more incredulity than good will. Chinese envoys were sent to explore his territories and to examine into the practices of his court, and these were in turn followed by Chinese generals instructed to subdue and annex the countries skirting, and, in a military sense, commanding the districts of Nanyuei. Having vanquished the resistance of the mountaineers of Western Szchuen, Vouti's lieutenants employed them in constructing roads through the most difficult parts of that region, and by this measure the greater portion of Szchuen was made a Chinese province, and Nanyuei became isolated and outflanked. The new possession was divided by Vouti into twelve departments, and took its place for the first time in history as an integral portion of the Chinese Empire. Similar events were occurring in other quarters of the country, and several princes, after being deposed, had to esteem themselves fortunate in the loss of nothing more than their states. Others, such as the King of Wei, anticipated the inevitable by a timely surrender, so that on all sides, and from a variety of causes, there was a tendency to promote the union of China.

The effect of the failure and disgrace of Wang Kua had been to inspire the Tartars with fresh courage and audacity. The war once begun they prosecuted it after their own fashion with the greatest vigour. Their raids became more incessant and more daring, and in the skirmishes which ensued with the Chinese forces they were more often

« AnteriorContinua »