Imatges de pàgina
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• I proceed to demonftrate that C was antiently used where we employ G.

LECIO PUCNANDOD ECfOCIONT.

Legio pugnando effugient.

CONIVCI ET FILIO VENE MERENTIBUS.
Conjugi et filio bene merentibus.;

In Spanish, digo for dico. Segundo for fecundo.

¶ As to K, it is even denied a place in many alphabets antient, and modern. Latin, Armoric, Irish, Portuguese, Italian, French.

It was feldom used by the Saxons; but often by the Goths and Grecians, and the Romans copied the latter for a short space. Q. Is not in Hebrew, Greek, Iflandic, Saxon, Runic, antient Irish, nor Cornish. It is compounded of C and a vowel.

The Saxon e and — the Gothic &&N are,
A←

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in our author's opinion,the most ancient fymbols in the world. So far as the fyftem of original and fymbolic letter goes, it is probably correct. The human voice acquires the use of various and minute inflections only by degrees, and the words, when more numerous, render this acquifition neceffary for the purpose of diftinction. It is, in this way, that the early words are undoubtedly long, for what, in the more perfect languages is ftyled the radix, grammarians find, in ages long fubfequent to the original formation of the word, and generally in confequence of abftraction. Strangers, for inftance, a word of Grecian derivation, muft have been formed, fince it was a term neceffarily employed, long before the language had acquired its prepofition -extra, though this is now confidered as its radix.

When to each fymbolic mark our author fixes a peculiar meaning, and traces it in the form of the letter, his abfurdities are numerous, though fometimes entertaining. We fhall add the fignification of the fymbols, and one fpecimen of the obfervations.

· A. MOTIVE *.-B. INHABITATION.-C. CAUSE †.-D. COMPLETION 1.-E. ENERGY §.-I. EXTENT .-L. ExTENT .-M. MIGHT.-N. PRODUCTION.-O. INDIVIDUAL or WHOLE.-R. MOTION.-S. EXISTENCE.'

Give me leave to apprize you that in very remote antiquity innumerable words began with B, which are now fpelt with it's derivatives F. P. V, especially when ufed imperatively, for as B

Caufing motion, Ab. Ad.- † Cause, infirumental.- Caufe, total. Caule efficient. . Energy or effect proceeding. Indefinite.—¶ Longitudinal

and indirect.'

fignifies

1

fignifies inhabit, feize, occupy-it was prefixed to what gramma rians are pleased to denominate verbs, in the fame manner as it is now prefixed to other parts of speech. B-gone means be in motion. B-good means be in goodness. In the revolution of ages, polite writers declined it's fervices. The populace indeed have fo ftrong an attachment to this antient mode of diction that they Bfpatter and B-fprinkle all the verbs in the language. Dr. Johnfon has retained feveral in his dictionary which are obfolete in elegant life.

B-C. That is-Be the Caufe. Abbreviated. B-Caufs. E. G. FaC feiam Be the Caufe of my knowing-B-Causs my knowing, or cause me to know.

The-Ais incidental in the preterite it makes fici; in compounds flcio-merely for diftinction of founds.

To all fymbols expreffive of energy or motion, the antients poftfixed-D-to indicate the completion of fuch energy or motion. Hence we have-T-at the end of fact, act, &c.

I leave it to the learned to determine whether this is a confequence of the rude fimplicity of primitive diction, or of philofophical refinement. The fact is indifputable. E. G.

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Sci quis Hemonem leiberom sciens dui D, Parricida D efto D.
In alto D Mari D puenando D. Duilian pillar.

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Were I permitted to fpeak in the fchools, I might add-C is a caufe in Potenția; act is a caufe in esse.

• When you speak imperatively, you excite the dormant power ; and the obedient perfon acts. When he has finished, he has act— ED the part allotted hin.

Now the fymbol-D-indicates action completed. It is a—C -clofed with a line-D. And in this it differs from-Q-For the circle is effentially complete; the femicircle effentially imper

fect.

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It is remarkable that in the Ilandic tongue-D-is named the Tyr: that is the clofer. In Armoric to tei is to clofe, thatch, or complete.

C-fignifies that the recipient is open to action. Open to inquiry. D that the action is completed, the inquiry clofed. Literally the conclufion of the energy-E-. How natural! how elegant !'

We must now leave Ariftarchus, whofe ingenuity we have commended, and whofe errors have pleafed and inftructed us, for they are the errors of genius; they are faults much more interesting than the level accuracy of many works which pafs through our hands, where, though we cannot blame, we fometimes are inclined to fleep. With lefs hafte, and in better circumftances, our author might been a pleafing and accurate inftructor.

The

The Freedom of Human Action explained and vindicated: in which the Opinions of Dr. Priestley on the Subject are particularly confidered. 8vo. 4s. Boards. Nicol. 1791.

THI

"HIS celebrated question will probably never be decided: the consciousness of poffeffing the power to choofe, to reject what is difagreeable or hurtful, and to select what is pleafing or falutary, as it at once influences the unlearned or unenquiring, biaffes in a more imperceptible degree, the rational enquirer. It requires much time and frequent examination to discover that our internal, as well as external fenfes, are fallacious; that much of what we fee is vifionary, that our clearest perceptions are often unreal. Our prefent author engages in the question, apparently without prejudice; but he foon prevents us from implicitly trusting his reafoning, by a want of accuracy in his distinctions, and fome obvious errors in his remarks. The early distinction of active and paffive, as well as the peculiar excellence of each, not accurately perceived in the material world, and applied too harfhly to the mental functions, are inftances of this kind. The confufion of defires and motives, often confidered as synonymous, is another error which pervades the whole reafoning: we cannot, for these and fimilar reafons, truft our author's conclufions; and it would involve us in endless difputes to follow him very minutely in his arguments. We fhall felect his propofitions:

• Propofition 1. That the nature of the will, or whether it be free or neceffary, must be determined folely from an examination into its qualities, as an inherent caufe, and not from its connexion with motives.

• Propofition 2. That the will poffeffes an active power of a fort very different from that of any other faculty of the mind, and which is the bafis of free-agency.

Propofition 3. That the will alfo poffeffes a power, by which it is enabled (through the medium of certain auxiliary motives, if they be wanted) to form a volition in favour of any affigned motive of the number, which may exist in a cafe of deliberation and choice. Or, in other words, that the will is endowed with a property of fo varying and fixing its volitions, as entities it to be deemed ftrictly free.

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• Propofition 4. That, whether the will be free, or not free, a definite volition will always be formed in definite circumstances. Or, that from the truth of a definite volition being formed in definite circumstances, no proof can be drawn either that the will is free or neceffary.'

The first and third propofitions are the most decifive ones in this question. The meaning of the firft, if we rightly com

prehend

prehend it, is, that the will, acted on by motives, is so far palfive; and this is what our author calls (we think illogically) an inherent caufe,' without meaning to imply that it may not become active in its turn. But to decide the question, it is neceffary, he informs us, to enquire how the will follows motives; whether it be in a way that may be deemed free, er in one that ought to be deemed neceffary.'-This is followed up in the third propofition, by the author's attempt to show that the will may vary, and fix its volitions. We mean not to quibble with words, or to afk how the will appears, but in its action of volition, or how volition can fix volition? The au thor means, perhaps, that motives appear, at different times, in views varioufly forcible, and what may influence at one time will ceafe to influence at another; fo that the mind seems free in felecting thofe objects, to obtain which, the motive is fuffi ciently strong, and the volition fufficiently powerful to be drawn out in action. Even if this is the idea it seems to be fallacious. The influence of every material caufe is modified by the state of the body acted on, even when the action is moft neceffary; and the influence of mental caufes muft be the fame. If, for inftance, the fight of meat neceffarily induces the fenfation of hunger, when the ftomach is well, the motive is fufficiently powerful to counteract the inclination to purfue other business; but when the stomach is disordered, it no longer excites the wish to eat in preference to another engagement. These are connections partly material, but purely neceflary, where there is fcarcely any veftige of freedom of action. If however on the contrary, the mind is deeply engaged in any deep investigation, the motive of eating will fcarcely excite volition on the fight of food. The whole of our author's reafoning proves nothing more than that motives act in different circumftances, with different degrees of force: it does hot prove that, in given circumstances, the influence of motives is not neceffarily connected with the fuitable actions; in other words, the will is not endowed with a property four author fhould have faid power) of fo varying and fixing its vo litions, as entitles it to be deemed ftrictly free. The will is influenced by motives which vary in their power of drawing it into motion, according to the different ftates and conditions of the mind; but which, in given circumftances, are always followed by fimilar actions,

In the fubfequent parts of the volume, where our author purfues the fubject in fome collateral and lefs direct views, we perceive, we think, fimilar inaccuracy. The following paffage is more correct: we have, in our review of Mr. Cooper's Ef fays, glanced at the fubject; and may, at a future time, refume it. It is only neceffary at prefent to repeat, that the arguments

which convince us 'that definite actions are connected with definite motives,' cannot, in any respect, apply to the deity. Motives can only influence actions, with a view to fome end; and if to affume the strongest ground, the deity be fuppofed incapable of acting inconfiftent with his attributes, his faculties and powers are still unlimited, and the fame motives may be pursued to the fame ends by an infinite number of different methods. Is he limited in the end? They are the limits with which he has confined himself, and prove only that God cannot be the author of evil, but of good.'-Let us attend, however, to our author.

• In conclufion of these remarks I shall just obferve, that if (as the neceffitarians urge as a leading principle of their doctrine) nothing cae be free, that is not independent of all influence and connexion, then it is evident the deity cannot be free, as his actions are doubtless under the influence of motives, and fomehow connected with something that precedes. This, indeed, these secaries have of late not fcrupled to grant. The inference is an unpleafing one, to fay no worse of it. But is there not danger of its being made more fo, by carrying the deduction a ftep farther? The deity, we allow, exifts neceffarily, and if he do not poffefs freedom, (to feparate his actions, as it were, from the ground of his being) muft we not conlude, that every thing we know, or can conceive; all existence, and every occurrence refpecting both time and eternity, is grounded upon neceffity in one form or other? Neceffity thus becomes all in all; and how we honour God in the conception, is not eafy to make out. Surely, then, these inferences, in fo very myfterious a province of inquiry, should, at ence, ftrike the principles which produce them from every modest and well-informed mind; and if imagination's guilt (as the poet calls it) may enter into our fpeculations, where can it be more clearly feen, than in fabricating fyftems of theology, of which thefe principles make a part?'

Though we cannot highly compliment our author as an ac curate metaphyfician, he appears through every page of his work to be a truly pious and a good man. Thefe are qualities, without which, learning and fcience are lighter than air, and more infignificant than the motes in the fun-beams.

An Expofition of the Beginning of Genefis. An Expofition of the
Epifle to the Romans.-The Doctrine of Baptifm.-MOPOH
OEOT, or the Form of God. By W. Lewelyn. 4 Vols. 8vo.
10s. 6d. fewed. Evans. 1791.

THERE is a certain fet of men who delight to involve every

thing they treat of in mystery and confufion. From the Ampleft facts they draw the moft unaccountable conclufions;

and

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