I cannot fling with lib'ral hand the grain, And tell the feather'd race fo biest around, With broken necks you flutter on the ground." Skim the free air, and fearch the fruitful fields- The cry of murder fhall not damn my dome." The Elegy on my dying Afs' abounds with reflections in terefting, pathetic, and natural. The following lines contain a mixture of tenderness and humour: the poet's eyes are full of tears, but a fatirical fimile plays about his mouth: the parody is well executed, and its object need not be pointed out! Oft to the field as health my footstep draws, Thy turf fhall furely catch thy mafter's eye; Pleas'd will I tell how oft we us'd to roam; Thy victories will I recount with joy ; The various trophies by thy fleetness won; Beheld the feats by namefake Peter done.' The Academic Ode, on the Danger of Criticifm; the Pro-. grefs of Admiration, or the Windfor Gardeners, in other words, the Progrefs of the Windfor Gardener's Admiration of Majefty; the Progrefs of Knowledge, in which a neighbouring monarch is wickedly reprefented as going to Eton, to enquire about the actions of Cæfar; and to introduce, by his questions, fome of the ridiculous traits, which Squire Peter and others, not yet taken,' have induftrioufly invented or embellished, follow. They have the true Pindaric relish, and will be laughed or frowned at, according to the humour or the party of the reader. The Addrefs to the Virtues is highly humourous, and we we fhall tranfcribe a few lines. If Peter objects to our quotations, we must remind him of his first addrefs to the Reviewers in his Supplicating Epiftle.' Quote from my works whate'er you pleafe; For extra&s lo-I'll put no angry face on, Thefe, however, must be the laft; finis chartæque viæque. Born in the fkies- a lofty habitation- How could you think the paffions to withstand, An entire and complete Hiftory, political and perfonal, of the Boroughs of Great Britain. Vol. I. 8vo. 10. 6d. Boards. Riley. 1792. A Reform in parliamentary reprefentation has undergone much difcuffion of late years; and though fome of its advocates have brought difcredit upon the measure, by the chimerical plans they propofed, and the vehemence with which they were actuated, yet the fubject is undoubtedly of the greatest importance to a free conftitution, and deferves, when temperately treated, the moft ferious attention of the public. The chief complaint with regard to the rights of the people, is the inequality of representation, by which, in its prefent ftate, only a fmall part of the commons is entitled to a fuffrage at the election of members of parliament. This partial and exclufive privilege, it is contended, is inconfiftent with liberty; the nature of which requires, that all the inhabitants of a free ftate fhould enjoy in an equal degree every privilege cilential to the conftitution of fuch a government. Against this general and indifcriminate equality of right, it is argued, on the other hand, that ail men do not, either by nature or fortune, enjoy the fame capacity of exercising the right of election, to their own political advantage, or that of the community; and that, even admitting the exiftence of fuch a capacity, the conftitution of parliament, eftablished by long prescription, has placed the right of election in the hands of a few, whom to deprive of this ancient inheritance, would therefore be an act of injuftice. It will readily be acknowledged by all impartial enquirers,. that however great, and almost unfurmountable, may be the difficulties annexed to a general right of election, yet such a right is actually infeparable from the idea of perfect liberty. Upon the fame principle it may be argued, that any charter granted by the crown, to confer the privilege of fending mem bers to parliament, is a violation of general freedom, by re ftricting to local diftricts a privilege which belongs equally and unalienably to every part of the nation. And it will thence likewife follow, that no prefcription, however ancient, can justly be urged as a fanction to fuch a mode of reprefentation as is inconfiftent with the general equality of the people, con fidered in a political view, In whatever light this great public queftion be confidered, the final determination of it is attended with no fmall embar raffment; and political theory and practice feem to be at variance in the decifion. If we admit the universal right of election, it will be found extremely difficult to regulate the exercife of that right, in fuch a manner as not only to render it beneficial, but to prevent it from becoming actually injurious to public freedom. If, on the other hand, we attempt to avoid those effects, by any limitation of right, even under the moft plaufible pretext, we should offer violence to a principle which is, in fact, the bafis of liberty. In fuch a dilemma, it might be prudent to make a compromife, between what is ftrictly just in fpeculation, and what may be practifed with the greatest advantage to the community. For this purpose, perhaps, a reform of apparent abufes only, is the expedient which ought to be aimed at by a politician of moderate prin ciples, without attempting, efpecially all at once, a total renovation of what may feem to have been the original conftitution of the country. This temperate conduct is the more advifcable, when we confider not only the great profperity of the nation, but the length of time during which it has maintained its liberties, under the prefent mode of reprefentation; and thofe liberties never can be infringed, while there fubfifts that jealoufy of the executive power, which is natural to a mixed form of government, and is the distinguishing characteristic of British fubjects. Let us now proceed to give an account of the work before us. In the first chapter, the author confiders the neceffity, propriety, and chief principles of enquiring into the original state of our reprefentation. His purpofe is, to prove that our liberties may be renovated without the deftruction of the conftitu tion or perfonal facrifice, by a free, equal, and entire reprefentation of the people. In the fecond chapter he treats of parliament; its meaning power, and privileges, with attendant obfervations. As our ftate-abufes, fays he, are not in the laws-but in their administration, we are not under the fame neceffity of creating a new fystem; nor need we, to restrain unjust influence, intrench upon juft prerogative. The evil refides more in ourfelves than in the government. Were every voter in the kingdom to resolve never, from this moment, to receive a bribe or gratuity, or to choose a placeman or penfioner, the conftitution would recover its energy, and corruption would ceafe. But as human nature in general is more likely to be feduced by the offer of a prefent advantage, and is very little affected by the profpect of diftant confequences, while bribes are offered they will be received. The remedy is, therefore, to prevent all poffibility of tempting the voter by either reward or promife; and to effect this, with fafety to the conftitution, requires the united wifdom and difinterested efforts of the nation.' In the three fucceeding chapters the author examines the right of reprefentation before the conqueft. It has been afferted by fome political writers, that the commons of England were no part of the ancient commune concilium before the 49th of Henry the Third, and that it was then introduced by rebellion; but the author endeavours to prove, and in our opinion with fuccefs, that the mickle-gemote, wittenagemote, commune concilium, and baronagium Angliæ, were chiefly conftituted by the commons or people of England during the time of the Britons and Saxons. The fixth chapter treats of ancient right to landed property, This the author concludes to have been allodial, and poffeffed free from all thofe fervices and incumbrances which afterwards distinguished feudal tenures. Some writers have maintained, that lands held by allodial tenure were only annual poffeffions; but our author justly obferves, that as they were devifeable by fale, or deed of gift, they must have been an inheritance. The following extract from this part of the work, will give our readers an idea of the author's principles, at the fame time that it shows the difficulty of correcting the abufes which he wishes to be eradicated: The country being, thus, divided into two fpecies of individuals, one poffeffing the land as the proprietor, and the other cultivating it as their vaffals, the privilege of attending the legislative affemblies, as well as having a fhare in the proceedings of the judiciary courts, were neceffarily confined to the land-holders. But it must be obferved, that this privilege of land-hol ders extended to every freeman of the country. War and agri culture being their chief employments, there were no other but poffeffors of land to claim the privilege. Arts and commerce had not then created other ranks to claim the exercise of this invalu able bleffing. The ancient right, therefore, of freeholders atiending their leffer parliaments of the county courts, and the greater of the wittena-gemotes, has been falfely urged as a precedent to prove, that none but poffefors of fuch estates were competent to the exercife of elective franchise,-unless they were freemen of chartered boroughs. As land was the only original poffeffion of our Saxon ancestors, it was this fpecies of property alone which could entitle them to the right of freemen. But had they owned any value of merchandize that claimed the protection of their government, as free and independent members of the community, they would equally have had the power of making their own laws, Not merely poflefling the right of electing reprefentatives, they would have been, as they were, their own legislators. The Saxon right of election was not confined to the choice of a member of parliament, Every officer, whether civil, military, ecclefiaftical, and even regal, they appointed. And this right of election, which our ancestors brought with them from Germany, ftill exists in that country. The election of the emperor is the remains of that noble and diftinguished privilege. Thus, while the defcendants of Saxons in England have fo loft their ancient right, as not one in thirty-two has the power of choosing a member for a paltry borough, one Saxon in Germany has a vote in the choice of his fovereign. Such is the different tenour of liberty in England and Saxony. But this is not the fault of our conftitution it is the corrupt practices which have turned even our privileges against our interefts. According to the present fyftem of election, a fmall part of us have the power of voting for those who facrifice us to their own ambition. And if fuch be the confequence of our elective rights, is it not infanity to be defirous of claiming a favour which, according to the prefent fyftem of influence, we must exercife to our deftruction? We should first restore the practice to its original purity, before we can expect to refume our rights with the leaft advantage to ourselves or the community. We may prove that every copyholder, as well as freeholder-every householder as well as every burgess of a chartered city or borough have, according to the first principles of our conftitution, an equal right in the legislature. We may prove that charters were only infringements on the univerfal liberties of the people, in favour of fuch as were in the immediate intereft, or under the arbitrary controul, of fovereignty. But all thefe evidences will not restore our rights, unless all parties unanimously join in the renovation of the state. he corrupt influence of contending ambition, must be changed for |