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hatred and envy, as English disasters

in South Africa, has been hailed with uproarious satisfaction.

It is now almost forty years since I first began to follow German politics. The interest which caused me to watch the phases of the dramatic and heroic struggle for the reconstruction of Germany and the closer union of the different German states became, if possible, greater after the new German Empire was called into existence. This has always seemed to me to be the most portentous political fact of the second half of the nineteenth century. For this reason I have endeavored to follow the movement of German opinion with special care, and long and intimate acquaintance with many of the leading statesmen, men of letters, historians, and trusted national leaders of the German people, has given me some facilities for doing so. I deeply regret to say that ever since I can remember, this opinion has been growing steadily more and more hostile to Great Britain, and it has not become less so by such arrangements as the cession of Heligoland, or conventions such as have been entered into dealing with territories in Africa or places like Samoa. I do not desire to criticize these arrangements in detail. It is not important for my argument that I should do so. I merely wish to insist upon the fact that not only have they done nothing to promote the growth of friendly feeling in Germany towards England, but, on the contrary, they have been interpreted in the former country as indications of nervousness and weakness on the part of the latter. They have tended to produce contempt; and if it is desired to gain the respect of Germany, it is a matter of prime necessity to make it quite clear that, for the purpose of modifying German hostile feeling, England is not prepared under any circumstances to pay blackmail.

The present Duc de Broglie, in his ex

ceedingly interesting work, "Fréderic II et Marie Thérèse," points out to those who desire to understand Bismarck and the German policy of the present day, to which he has given an abiding direction, the advisability of closely studying the life and times of Frederic the Great. The historian Treitschke, in one of the most brilliant of his writings, insists on the same doctrine. Any one who grasps this truth and acts on it will find the source of the hostile feeling to England which is now so wide and deep from one end of Germany to the other. It arose in Prussia, in the days of Frederic the Great, and it has grown and become strong with the growth and strength of Prussia. It originated after the resignation of Lord Chatham, or as he then was, Mr. Pitt, in 1761, and the consequent abandonment in 1762 of Frederic the Great, during the Seven Years' War. The treachery of Lord Bute, in intriguing with the enemies of Frederic, then the close ally of England, and especially his disgraceful correspondence with Choiseul, has not received from English historians anything like the attention it deserves. Nevertheless, it has had the most abiding results. The great king himself never forgave it. When England afterwards got into serious difficulties, when she had trouble in America, and her position as a great power was seriously threatened by the Franco-Spanish alliance, he remembered it to her cost. He advised his countrymen to be always most cautious and circumspect in dealing with England. His brother, Prince Henry, who differed from him on so many points, agreed in this, and became the representative of an anti-English policy till his death in 1802. After him, Prince Hatzfeld and Field Marshal Kalckreuth took up the tale. An anti-English party existed in Prussia throughout the whole struggle with Napoleon. During the Congress of Vienna, anti

English ideas found expression in the bitter sayings of Freiherr von Stein, and later on in the writings and letters of such distinguished men as Gneisenau, Grolman, and Clausewitz, who, in their turn, passed on the tradition of animosity and distrust of England to men like Treitschke, Mommsen, Haüsser, and Bernhardi, to statesmen like Bismarck, and soldiers like Moltke and Goeben. The settled foreign policy of Prussia may be clearly seen in the letters of Bismarck during the Crimean War. There was at that time a group of men in Berlin, comprising among others such influential persons as Count Goltz, Count Pourtales, Bethman-Holweg, and Mathis. This group was in favor of an English alliance, and their organ in the press, the Preussische Wochenblatt, published very many articles in this sense. Bismarck was then Prussian minister to the Bund at Frankfurt, and from thence he wrote to Manteuffel, who was Prime Minister of Frederic William IV, a number of letters which have been published by Poschinger, and are worth very careful study. They are directed against entering into an alliance with England, and urge in the strongest way the policy of keeping on intimate terms with Russia. This policy he always adhered to when he himself became Prime Minister. He was confirmed in it by the attitude of England in the question of the neutrality of the Baltic, in that of the Elbe Duchies, and still more by her conduct during the FrancoGerman War. At the very outset of that war, Lord Lyons, the English Ambassador in Paris, was most unfortunate in the language he held to the French Government. He assured the Duc de Grammont after the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and when it became clear that the French were about to take the initiative in commencing hostilities, that they might always count on

the goodwill of England whether they went to war or not. This language was never repudiated either by Lord Granville or Mr. Gladstone. But this was not all. During the last days of the war the Germans discovered that French levies opposed to them in the West were armed with weapons from English arsenals. The defence of the Gladstonian Administration was that the weapons were sold to private purchasers, and not to the French Government of the day. This was, no doubt, true, but it was, to say the least, unfortunate that the English authorities did not refrain from selling these weapons while the war was raging. I know, as a matter of fact, that Moltke could never be persuaded to the day of his death that the administration of which Mr. Gladstone was the head, was not culpably negligent in the matter, and wilfully assisted French resistance to the German armies. Bismarck thought so, too, and from that time he became firmer, if possible, than before in his anti-English policy. Friction between the English and German Governments was constantly recurring, and it was largely owing to the ability, tact, and influence of the late Lord Ampthill that very critical complications did not arise, especially after Mr. Gladstone's second accession to power in 1880. The suspicion with which Bismarck regarded England, particularly during the time of Mr. Gladstone's influence, drove him to make friendship with Russia the corner-stone of his system. He adhered to his policy even after he formed the Triple Alliance, and it was partly in consequence of a secret treaty with Russia, in which the interests of his ally, Austria, were, to say the least of it, not carefully considered, and which he kept secret even from his own sovereign, that he was driven from office. The policy of Bismarck, as regards Russia and England, with the exception of the time during which Count

Caprivi was Chancellor of the Empire, has been, in the main, adopted by those in charge of the affairs of Germany. The real reason why it is so persistently followed is that German statesmen realize the necessity and wisdom of keeping on good terms with Russia, because of her military power and the strategical advantages which the condition of the eastern frontier of Prussia would confer upon the Russian army in case of war. It is the dangers which Germany fears a war with Russia would entail that make her anxious to cultivate Russia's goodwill. If England, by the adoption of a settled policy, would be as dangerous to Germany as Russia, the whole attitude of Germany would instantly change towards her, and the greatest efforts would be made to secure her friendship.

It is quite childish to imagine that persons in the highest authority in Germany are not largely responsible for the hostility to England which is shown throughout the German Empire. We all know how Prince Bismarck managed the Press, and every one moderately well-informed about German matters is perfectly aware that many newspapers in every part of the Empire are directly or indirectly inspired by government. There are prints, moreover, not published in Germany, which have made themselves remarkable by the most preposterous and venomous calumnies against England, to whose attacks men in high positions of responsibility in the Empire are not strangers. I do not say that the German Foreign Office is directly responsible for abuse of the baser sort which is continually heaped on England. The Frankfurter Generalanzeiger, which has exposed with much courage the degradation and mendacity of so large a section of the German Press, has shown how the absurd calumnies are invented, which prints like the Münchener Neuste Nachrichten, for instance, publish to flatter

But in

the prevailing Anglophobia. Munich every one knows that the Neuste Nachrichten takes its tone from the Prussian Legation in the Bavarian capital. It is, then, impossible to believe that the attitude it assumes of truculent hostility to England is displeasing to authorities in Berlin. The question now arises, what is the meaning of all this underhand action, and what does the German Government expect to gain by it? There are various motives. One may be discovered in the history of Prussian relations with Holland. Those who have followed with care German political literature, or who happen to have been at all intimate with German politicians, can hardly have failed to observe that the idea of obtaining a firm footing on the shores of the North Sea has been present to the minds of political thinkers in Germany for generations. The settlement at the Congress of Vienna, with respect to the northeast frontier of Holland, was a bitter disappointment to the Prussian National Party of that day. Men like Gneisenau and Grolman imagined that the German cause had been seriously injured. Blucher was thinking of Holland when, after Waterloo, he proposed the famous toast, "Mögen die Federn der Diplomaten nicht verderben was das Schwert der Völker mit 80 grossen Anstrengungen errungen." There is, of course, at present no desire to make Holland a state of the Germanic Confederation. But the idea of obtaining concessions as regards customs to be followed as time goes on by a regular Customs Union, and then ultimately by a Naval Convention, which would practically destroy the independence of Holland, is certainly widely entertained in influential circles in Germany. This is one reason why sympathy with the Boers and hostility to England is encouraged by persons in high places. When Holland is brought within the sphere of German influence

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it is hoped that Germany may obtain a considerable position in the Malay Archipelago, and perhaps also at the Cape, should England be so fatuous as not to secure now real and undisputed supremacy in South Africa. Another obvious reason why the German authorities encourage hostility to England is the desire to obtain a more powerful navy. The Kaiser well understands the truth of the old French proverb, "Qui mer a terre." He aspires to do for the navy what his grandfather did for the army. But the true reason why an increase of the navy is supported by ministers and politicians is to prepare for a struggle with England. This has been almost openly avowed by Admiral Tierpitz, who presented the imperial proposals to the Reichstag. The ministerial statement shows how steadily the conviction is growing that England is the country which Germany should enIdeavor to overthrow. And the more ignorant Germans are becoming persuaded that our position in the world is undeserved, artificial, and cannot be maintained if seriously threatened. This view has been fostered for many years past by the most brilliant writers in essays and articles, and by leading journals and periodicals, which, in their turn, shape the policy of the cheap newspaper, which is the gospel of the village inn.

I have dwelt at this length on German hostility towards England because I conceive that it has a great deal to say to the general ill-feeling towards England which prevails on the Continent.

The attitude of France has been undoubtedly influenced by the manipulation by Germany of the French Press. Some years ago the pressing question in the mind of almost every Frenchman was how Alsace and Lorraine were to be recovered. Now, everything is changed, and there is no disguising the fact that at the bottom of French feel

ing there lies a rankling and implacable hatred toward England. This has been the work mainly of newspapers influenced and guided by Germany. Of all French papers the Petit Journal has far the largest circulation. Every fairly-informed man knows how it is influenced. It receives, perhaps, no direct support from Germany. It is conducted mainly in the interests of another power. It suits, however, German policy in that it strives to form an anti-English frame of mind. There are other French papers with a large circulation which are guided by Germany sometimes quite unconsciously to themselves in their attacks on England. In Russia the Petersburger Zeitung, an organ believed to be subsidized by the German Foreign Office, has been incessant in its endeavor to provoke hostility between England and Russia, and German agents have been careful to represent to Russian statesmen that if England is friendly to the development of German interests in Asia Minor it is with a view of producing friction between the Russian and the German Empires. There is but one method by which this policy of Germany can be checked; and that is by bringing home to the minds of the Germans that its consequences may be serious.

It is well that we should realize what Germany has to lose in a conflict with England. It must be steadily kept in view that Germany has become a great industrial nation since the Empire was formed. The development of German shipping has been marvellous. Her mercantile marine cannot, indeed, be compared to the English in size, but it is now greater than that of France or of the United States. In 1871 the foreign trade of Germany was about 250 millions sterling. It is now 500 millions sterling. Of this 350 millions are conveyed by sea. In the event of a war with England this sea-borne commerce would be ruined. Besides this.

there is a further consideration to be remembered. Between 1882 and 1895 the population of Germany increased The from 45,220,000 to 51,770,000. population is increasing at the rate of 800,000 persons a year; and at the next census the population of the Empire will be something like 60,000,000 people. The emigration from the Empire, which, a quarter of a century ago, was about 200,000 people, fell last year to 20,000. The decrease of emigration and the positive increase of the population has been also attended by a diminution of the number of persons who are engaged in agriculture. Between 1882 and 1895 the total number of persons engaged in agricultural pursuits fell from 19,225,000 to 18,501,000. On the other hand, the number of persons dependent on trade with countries beyond the sea has increased from 16,000,000 to 20,000,000. In the middle of the seventies Germany exported corn, meal, and other articles to Scandinavia, Switzerland, France and England. She now imports all these, and, as Herr v. Brandt has shown, the most valuable portion of German trade is with the British Empire, and its development is at least partly owing to English commercial policy. Such facts surely in

dicate the very dangerous position which Germany would be in if England chose to make her power felt. Germany would have either to give way or to risk a war which would produce so much suffering to large numbers of her people as would surely strengthen the already formidable elements of disorder. What these elements are we may easily discover by observing the political groups in the Reichstag. There are in it no less than fourteen distinct political groups. The largest of these is the Centre, or so-called Catholic Party. This was formed in the year 1870, mainly by men whose motives were actuated by a personal dislike to Bismarck. The party, on its formation,

under their influence assumed an atti-
tude of acute hostility to the Chancel-
lor. Bismarck, partly in consequence
of personal irritation, and partly per-
suaded by leading Liberals, rushed into
a war not merely with this party, but
with Catholicism in Germany. The re-
sult was greatly to strengthen the pow-
er of the Centre. The Particularists,
the ultra-Conservatives in Bavaria,
Baden, and Würtemburg, and Radicals
at various places all over the country,
gathered round this party, and took
advantage of ecclesiastical organization
in electioneering struggles, hoping, un-
der the cloak of religion, to further
their political aims. The present Cen-
tre is 105 in number. It would not be
true to say that all these are hostile to
the existence of the German Empire,
and desire its destruction; but some of
them undoubtedly do so, and take no
pains to conceal their wishes. After
the Centre, the most important, though
not the most numerous group of the
Diet, is the Social Democratic Party.
This party is the outcome of two dis-
tinct ideas, one represented by Lassalle,
the Schweitzer, and the other by Marx,
Liebknecht, and Bebel. It was formed
in 1875. One of the most remarkable
circumstances in the political life of
Germany, and which must give pause
to every reflecting man, is the growth
of this party, which is openly hostile to
the very existence of the Empire. In
the general election of 1878, 437,000
votes were cast for it. In the last elec-
tion 2,125,000 electors voted for its
candidates, and it secured some fifty-
six seats in the Reichstag. The Reich-
stag is a Chamber of 397 members, and
if closely looked into it will be found
that if we add to the members of the
Centre, the Social Democrats, the Poles,
and Deputies representing other discon-
tented interests, more than one-half of
the members of the Reichstag are
strongly disaffected to the existing in-
stitutions of the country. Surely a

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